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Abstract
The IRS has determined that the largest amount of tax evasion is associated with a
relatively small percentage of returns prepared by tax practitioners. Tax practitioners
can generally serve in three roles|to assist aggressive tax planning and evasion, to act as
agents for the IRS and enforce the tax code, or simply be expensive outlets for tax return
preparation. Do the distributional statistics lead to the conclusion that tax practitioners
cause rather than divert additional tax evasion? The purpose of this paper is to address
the causal connection between return preparation choice and evasion. We nd that the
return characteristics for those seeking practitioners are associated with an increased
opportunity for tax evasion. But our analysis also shows that tax practitioners actually
lower tax evasion beyond what it would be if an individual had sought another means of
preparation, such as self preparation.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
The IRS estimates that for tax year 1992, as much as 73 billion dollars of tax was not
reported on individual income tax returns that were led [8]. The IRS believes that the
largest amount of this tax evasion was associated with a relatively small percentage of
all returns that were prepared by CPA's, attorneys, and Public Accountants, many of
whom are tax practitioners.
1
Three other types of return preparation account for the
remainder of the 73 billion dollars of tax evasion. They are self-prepared returns, non-
paid preparers,
2
and paid preparers who are not tax practitioners.
3
Tax practitioners
account for almost 43 percent of tax evasion and paid preparers account for almost
31 percent. Those returns prepared by the individual himself account for 22.8 percent

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ect the views of the sta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Certied Public Accountants (CPA's), attorneys, and Public Accountants who are in good standing
within their professional organizations, and who meet certain continuing education requirements estab-
lished by the IRS's Director of Practice are granted tax practitioner status. Tax practitioners not only
prepare tax returns for a fee, they also may represent the taxpayer in matters before the IRS, including
an audit, and provide expert opinions on positions maintained on a tax return that eectively shield the
taxpayer from large penalties. Public Accountants are licensed at the state level with requirements vary-
ing by state. Only four states, North Carolina, Virginia, Kansas, and Wyoming do not regulate Public
Accountants. Tax Practitioner behavior is governed by the Treasury Department's Circular No. 230,
which describes both grounds for, and penalties applicable for violations of, acceptable conduct by tax
practitioners. Table 1 shows that almost 17 percent of the returns led in 1979 used a tax practitioner.
2
Non-paid assistance includes returns that were prepared, advised, or reviewed by the IRS; returns
prepared by unpaid volunteers under the VITA (Volunteer Income Tax Assistance) program sponsored
by the IRS; or more generally by a family member. Preparers in this category face no legal burdens
associated with providing tax return preparation assistance. Table 2 show that nearly 11 percent of the
returns led in 1979 used a non-paid preparer.
3
Paid preparers include national tax services such as H & R Block, and local tax services that are not
tax practitioners. These rms set their own standards of conduct, unlike CPA's, attorneys, and Public
Accountants, and provide their own training. Moreover, paid preparers are not empowered to represent
the taxpayer before the IRS in the case of an audit, and have no authority to provide an expert opinion
to justify a position maintained by the taxpayer. Table 1 shows that nearly 29 percent of the returns
led in 1979 used a paid preparer.
of the total evasion. The remaining tax evasion, less than 4 percent, is attributed to
non-paid preparers.
In this paper we analyze the role that third party preparers of individual tax returns
have on tax evasion. In particular, our research analyzes the amount of tax evasion
on returns attributable to the type of return preparation used. We estimate a four
alternative switching regression model and treat the amount of tax evasion found in each
alternative as endogenous and dependent on the choice of return preparation mode. The
four return preparation modes are non-paid assistance, paid assistance who are not tax
practitioners, tax practitioners, and self-prepared returns. The relative frequency and
proportion of tax evasion attributable to these modes for tax year 1979 is summarized in
Table 1. We show that after controlling for taxpayer characteristics, the mode of return
preparation used aects tax compliance. An important nding is that the use of a tax
practitioner lowers the amount of tax evasion while the use of Non-Paid assistance or
Paid assistance has no eect on tax evasion. We also nd that complexity of the tax
return per se does not increase the amount of non-compliance if Practitioners prepare
the return. In fact, we nd that increased complexity may increase compliance with the
tax code if it results in an increase in the use of Practitioners. Thus, for example, while a
doubling of non-wage income and the addition of another form form leads to a 9 percent
increase in evasion in the short run, the additional complexity in the return and larger
income amounts will cause taxpayers to switch return preparation mode, resulting in less
than a 2 percent increase in evasion in the long run.
The data we use is based on a sample of tax returns audited in the Taxpayer Com-
pliance Measurement Program (TCMP) for 1979.
4
The data was subsequently released
by the IRS and is the most recent dataset available for public research. As the data
was aggregated by the IRS for sub-populations (i.e., districts and return types) before
release, we develop new estimators for use in discrete/continuous models in the presence
of aggregate data.
2 Previous Empirical Findings
The diversity of services provided, skill levels, and business intentions of third party
tax return preparers has made it diÆcult for economists to develop a unied theory of
tax return preparer behavior.
5
While few empirical studies of taxpayer compliance and
4
This dataset is the result of eorts by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to assess the size and
extent of non-compliance with the ling of individual Federal income tax returns. For public use, the
IRS prepared aggregate data extracts of the 1979 individual tax return micro-data set. For the extracts
used in this research, the aggregation takes place over all taxpayers in the 58 IRS districts, which are
geographically exclusive and exhaustive of the United States. Forty-four of the districts are states. Of the
remaining 14 districts, four are in New York and there are two each in California, Texas, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and Ohio.
5
Refer to Scotchmer [15], Scotchmer [14], Reinganum and Wilde [13], Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde
[6], and Klepper, Mazur and Nagin [9] for theoretical models of tax return preparation choice and tax
compliance.
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Table 1: Returns and Non-Compliance by Mode of Preparation, 1979
Proportion of Proportion of
Mode of Preparation Returns Noncompliance
SELF .442 .228
NON-PAID .106 .037
PAID PREPARERS .285 .308
PRACTITIONERS .167 .427
TOTAL 1.000 1.000
SOURCE: Special Research File of the 1979 TCMP, IRS
tax return preparation mode exist, some consistent results have emerged. In a series of
papers, Slemrod and Sorum [17], Slemrod [16], Collins, Milliron and Toy [1], Hite [7], and
Dubin, Graetz, Udell and Wilde [3] found that greater amounts of income, capital gains,
self-employment activity, sole-proprietor income, itemized deductions, return complexity,
age of taxpayer, and marginal tax, penalty, and audit rates all increase the use of paid
third party preparers, while greater educational levels attained or greater knowledge
of the tax code reduced the use of paid third party preparers. With the exception of
Dubin, Graetz, Udell and Wilde [3] these researchers combined (or could not separate)
Practitioners and Paid preparers in their analyses. Dubin, Graetz, Udell and Wilde [3]
additionally determined that greater amounts of wage, interest, and dividend income
reduce the demand for Practitioners relative to Paid preparers.
Long and Caudill [10] modeled both the demand for tax return assistance and reported
tax liability. They found that the reported tax liability from returns prepared by paid
preparers is less than for unassisted modes of return preparation. Erard [5] analyzed
the demand for tax return preparation and for tax evasion among self prepared, paid
preparers, and practitioners. He found that the demand for tax practitioners and paid
preparers increases with capital gains, small business or farm activity, rents and royalties,
the number of tax forms attendant on the return, being over 65 years of age, previous
audit history, the marginal tax rate, and the IRS audit rate. Erard found that the use
of tax practitioners lowers tax compliance.
In general, the empirical literature shows that greater amounts of income, and more
complex returns, increase the demand for third party return preparation. The eect
of this increased demand depends upon the type of return preparation selected. For
3
instance, a priori, the use of tax practitioners may or may not result in lower tax evasion.
Tax evasion may decline when tax practitioners are employed due to their tax expertise,
ability to exploit ambiguity in the tax code, and attestation function. Alternatively, tax
evasion could remain the same if third party return preparation assistance is largely a
matter of convenience. Finally, tax evasion may actually increase if tax practitioners are
sought for their assistance in aggressive tax planning. In the model presented below we
test these competing hypotheses.
3 Model
3.1 Specication
With the exceptions of Long and Caudill [10] and Erard [5], the empirical literature on
tax evasion has not controlled for the endogeneity of third party tax return preparers
on tax evasion.
6
While these analyses importantly control for the endogeneity of the
mode of tax return preparation, they restrict the choice set of preparation types. We
extend the research on the demand for tax return preparation services presented in Du-
bin, Graetz, Udell, and Wilde [3] and use audited tax return information to model the
eect of self-prepared (SELF), non-paid prepared (NON-PAID), paid prepared who are
not practitioners (PAID), and practitioners (PRACTITIONERS) on tax evasion using a
switching regression model.
We assume that the amount of tax evasion, Y
i
, on a return prepared in preparation
mode i is given by the regression model
Y
i
= X
0
i

i
+  if Æ
i
= 1; (1)
where Æ
i
= 1 if mode i is selected and 0 otherwise. Following Dubin, Graetz, Udell, and
Wilde [3], we assume a logistic probability model with
P
i
= Prob[Æ
i
= 1] =
e
 
i
Z
i
P
I
i=1
e
 
i
Z
i
: (2)
In the presence of correlation between  and Æ
i
, ordinary least squares estimation
of equation 1 yields inconsistent estimates of 
i
. Such correlation might arise because
6
Long and Caudill [10] use unaudited 1983 tax return information to model the dierence between
professional tax return preparation (combining tax practitioners and non-practitioner paid modes) and
non-paid modes of tax return preparation (combining self and non-paid assisted modes) on reported
tax liability. Erard [5] uses audited 1979 tax return information with a distinction between non-paid
prepared (combining self and non-paid assisted modes), paid-prepared that was not a practitioner, and
practitioner-prepared returns to model their eect on tax evasion. As Dubin, Graetz, Udell and Wilde
[3] show, restricting the choice of mode of return preparation to two or three alternatives can produce
misleading inferences about the motives for tax return preparation assistance. We build on their research
and analyze the eect of a larger choice set of preparer types on measurements of attendant tax evasion.
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unobservable characteristics of the taxpayer's behavior could simultaneously increase the
probability of selecting a tax practitioner and decrease the amount of tax evaded. In
discrete/continuous systems such as these, Dubin and McFadden [4] have derived several
estimators that allow consistent estimates of 
i
.
Dene  =  E( j Æ
i
= 1). Then E( j Æ
i
= 1) = 0. Under a set of assumptions for
a discrete/continuous model with logistic choice probabilities, Dubin and McFadden [4]
show that
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where Æ
im
= 1 when i = m and 0 otherwise, 
2
is the unconditional variance of  and
where 
m
is a correlation parameter between the m
th
mode of return preparation and .
For the I alternative model, equation 3 species I   1 selection correction terms. Each
of these terms can be separated into a correction variable
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Including these terms in a respecication of equation 1 with a correction for selection
bias, yields for each mode of return preparation
Y
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= X
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= 1: (6)
Consistent estimates of the parameters 
i
and 
m
in equation 6 can be achieved by
ordinary least squares if P
m
is known. Dubin [2] shows that when the true value of P
m
in equation 6 is not known, an estimate of P
m
may be substituted resulting in consistent
estimation of the parameters 
i
and 
m
. In the next section, we develop a consistent
estimation method for equation 6 using aggregate data.
3.2 Aggregation
In a previous paper, Dubin, Graetz, Udell and Wilde [3] estimate the choice model
(equation 2) using aggregate data from the 1979 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
5
Program (TCMP). To estimate equation 6 with aggregate data, let k = 1; : : : ; K represent
taxpayers in an IRS district; i = 1; : : : ; I be the modes of tax return preparation available
in an IRS district; and j = 1; : : : ; J denote the IRS districts. Let Æ
ijk
= 1 if the k
th
taxpayer in the j
th
IRS district selects the i
th
mode of return preparation, and zero
otherwise. Dene the number of taxpayers in the j
th
IRS district who select the i
th
mode
of return preparation as
N
ij
=
K
X
k=1
Æ
ijk
: (7)
The average value of tax evasion found on returns prepared by the i
th
mode in the j
th
IRS district is
Y
ij
=
K
X
k=1
Æ
ijk
N
ij
Y
ijk
: (8)
Linear aggregation of equation 6 across individuals in an IRS district and preparation
mode yields
N
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Equation 11 requires individual choice probabilities for return preparation which were
not available in our data. Instead, we rely on the average probability for district and
mode of preparation as estimated in Dubin, Graetz, Udell, and Wilde [3]. We replace the
average of the individual choice probabilities, P
ij
, by the choice probability of an average
individual, denoted by P
ij
.
Using probabilities of the average taxpayer rather than the average of taxpayer prob-
abilities introduces two possible problems. The rst problem is that P
mj
may be a biased
estimate of P
mj
.
7
Secondly, since P
mj
is not directly observed, we introduce an ap-
proximation error when the estimated P
mj
is employed. Each problem is mitigated by
estimating P
mj
over suÆciently homogeneous classes of taxpayers using a consistent es-
timator of aggregate choice shares. This approach was followed by Dubin, Graetz, Udell
7
The bias occurs because the logit probabilities dened by equation 2 are non-linear in Z. By
application of Jensen's inequality, it can be shown that the probability of the average response is greater
than the average of the probabilities of the individual response.
6
and Wilde [3], who used data grouped over 696 mutually exclusive and exhaustive cate-
gories that placed taxpayers into nearly homogeneous aggregation classes, and estimated
aggregate choice shares using a minimum chi-square estimation procedure.
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Substituting P
mj
for P
mj
, equation 9 can be rewritten as
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Equation 12 species the total amount of evasion associated with the i
th
preparation
mode in the j
th
IRS district. To apply least squares estimation to equation 12, note that
the error term,  
2ij
, has an expected value of 0 if Æ
ij
= 1 since it is the sum of K terms,
each which has conditional expectation equal to 0. Furthermore, the variance of  
2ij
is
of order N
ij
=
P
K
k=1
Æ
ijk
. Therefore, a correction for heteroscedasticity can be made to
equation 12 by dividing each member through by N
1
2
ij
.
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3.3 Data
The 1979 TCMP le for individual returns involves line-by-line audits of approximately
50,000 randomly selected tax returns. As discussed above, the dataset released by the IRS
aggregates the results of the 1979 TCMP audits by the 58 IRS district and four modes
of return preparation. Both the taxpayer's reported amounts and the adjusted amounts
recommended by the TCMP audit were recorded.
10
Our dependent variable (EVASION)
is the dierence between the taxpayer reported liability and the IRS examiner's corrected
liability.
To test the hypothesis that tax evasion decreases with the complexity of the tax
situation, we include in our regression model the number of forms led with the tax return
(FORM).
11
We also include two variables that are generally believed to be positively
8
See Dubin, Graetz, Udell and Wilde [3] for details.
9
The number of returns that were self prepared averaged 69,248 per IRS district oÆce, while the
number of returns for non-paid averaged 15,860; for paid preparers 44,521; and for practitioners was
26,241. Refer to Udell [18] for additional detail on aggregation in discrete/continuous models and the
issues of heteroscedasticity.
10
We use the corrected amounts of deductions and exemptions as measures of the true amounts of
these items.
11
These forms include schedule C for Prot or Loss from a Business; schedule D for Capital Gains
and Losses; schedule E the Supplemental Income Schedule to report income from rents, royalties, and
trusts; schedule F for Farm Income and Expenses; and Form 4797 for Sales of Business Property.
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correlated with tax evasion. They are the sum of income from schedules C, D, E, F, and
Form 4797 (COMPLEX) and state, local and real estate tax deductions (ASSET). The
later acts as a measure of state and local tax burden, while the former is associated with
federal tax burden. We include the frequency with which penalties were assessed in the
TCMP audit (PENALTY) to test whether penalties act as a deterrent to tax evasion.
To complete our specication, we include three additional variables. They are the
sum of wage, salary, interest, and dividend income (SIMPLE), the number of eligible
dependents claimed by the taxpayer (EXEMPTION), and the number of taxpayers over
65 years of age (OVER 65). Together, SIMPLE and COMPLEX account for nearly all of
a taxpayer's income. EXEMPTION and OVER 65 capture two important demographic
features. By our denition, EXEMPTION measures family size. An increase in EXEMP-
TION, all else held constant, should increase the amount of tax evasion if the additional
cost of a family member exceeds the value of the exemption. Similarly, OVER 65 mea-
sures age eects. The mean values of these variables for each mode of return preparation
are reported in Table 2.
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Table 2: Mean Values of Variables by Mode of Preparation
Variable Self Non-paid Paid Practitioner
SIMPLE 13,900 10,151 18,900 38,100
COMPLEX 963 740 2,255 7,252
ASSET 777 358 958 2,046
EXEMPTION 183 71 341 802
OVER 65 0.072 0.112 0.151 0.217
FORM 1.210 1.175 1.510 2.210
PENALTY 0.034 0.055 0.070 0.096
EVASION 112 130 225 655
Note: Amounts in dollars and frequencies in proportion of returns.
For each of the four modes of return preparation, we estimate equation 12 using
12
Note that the aggregation scheme described in the previous section places restrictions on the use of
variables ancillary to the 1979 TCMP data. In particular, the audit rate data available to researchers
is constant across IRS districts. Since audit rates do not vary across preparer modes within districts
they are not included in our regression specication. The audit rate appears in this analysis as a factor
aecting the demand for tax preparation services (Dubin, Graetz, Udell, and Wilde [3]).
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weighted least squares with the following specication:
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= 
0i
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X
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CORRECTION TERM
m
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2i
: (13)
4 Results
4.1 The Demand for Tax Evasion
Table 3 presents weighted least squares estimates of equation 13. An increase in either
SIMPLE or COMPLEX income increases the amount of tax evasion for Practitioner pre-
pared returns while only increases in COMPLEX income increase the amount of evasion
found on Paid prepared returns. We nd no signicant eect from either income variable
on evasion for Self prepared or Non-paid prepared returns. Our results for state and lo-
cal taxes (ASSET), family size (EXEMPTIONS), and taxpayers over the age of 65 years
(OVER 65) show no eect on tax evasion, with the exception that greater state and local
tax burden increases the amount of evasion found on Practitioner prepared returns.
Increases in the penalty rate (PENALTY) somewhat increase the amount of evasion
detected among Self and Paid prepared modes of return preparation. However, the
current penalty regime, with substantially higher penalty rates, was created largely during
the penalty reforms placed into law with the 1989 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
For example, the penalty for intentional disregard of rules with respect to the paying of
income tax was 5 percent of the underpayment of tax in 1979 (per the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 section 6653(a)) but is currently 20 percent (per the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 section 6662(b) as amended in 1989). Although we nd no support for a deterrent
eect from penalties, we do nd that relative to other modes of return preparation,
Practitioners reduce the eect of penalties on the amount of tax evasion.
Increases in the complexity of the tax return (FORM), decreases the amount of eva-
sion found on returns prepared by Practitioners, but not for any other mode of return
preparation. Finally, the coeÆcient of the selectivity correction parameter, C(P
m
; P
i
),
is signicant, and positive, for the Practitioner mode. This implies (from equation 5)
that there is a negative correlation between the unobservable characteristics aecting
the choice of Practitioner mode and the amount of evasion detected on the return. This
supports the hypothesis that Practitioners reduce non-compliance.
Two elasticity calculations are presented in Table 4. The rst four columns show
the short-run elasticities of tax evasion which condition on the mode of preparation.
The fth column presents the sum of the short-run elasticities over all modes of return
preparation. The sixth column presents the long-run elasticities of tax evasion. To derive
9
Table 3: Estimates of Tax Evasion
Weighted Variable Self Non-paid Paid Practitioner
ONE -8.617 -0.427 -87.698 61.159
(-0.283) (-0.007) (-2.361) (1.172)
SIMPLE 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.007
(0.091) (0.378) (1.150) (1.830)
COMPLEX 0.084 0.090 0.074 0.094
(1.541) (1.116) (2.693) (6.842)
ASSET 0.035 0.067 -0.035 0.076
(0.707) (0.498) (-0.918) (3.626)
EXEMPTION -0.046 0.113 -0.038 -0.034
(-0.199) (0.280) (-0.268) (-0.026)
OVER 65 -415.762 -141.249 -69.943 -427.087
(-1.059) (-0.311) (-0.212) (-1.384)
FORM 77.789 63.246 -89.682 -345.340
(0.557) (0.295) (-0.723) (-3.902)
PENALTY 1855.020 513.482 1846.570 36.152
(2.908) (0.781) (4.267) (0.085)
CORRECTION -57.010 15.041 135.024
(-0.759) (0.217) (2.539)
R-squared .79
Number of Observations 232
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.
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these elasticity concepts, we start with a denition of total evasion:
Y =
I
X
i=1
J
X
j=1
N
ij
Y
ij
: (14)
Expected total evasion is:
E(Y ) =
I
X
i=1
J
X
j=1
E(N
ij
Y
ij
jÆ
ij
= 1)P
ij
=
I
X
i=1
J
X
j=1
(N
ij
Y
ij
)

P
ij
(15)
where (N
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ij
)

= E(N
ij
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ij
= 1) and is given by equation 12.
In the short-run, i.e., conditional on a choice of tax return preparation mode the
component of expected total evasion from return preparation mode i is
P
J
j=1
(N
ij
Y
ij
)

P
ij
.
In the short-run tax return preparer choice is xed; therefore P
ij
is constant. Conditional
on choice of mode i, the short run evasion elasticity is

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The combined short-run elasticity is:

short
total
=
I
X
i=1

short
i
: (17)
In the long-run tax return preparation mode can be changed by the taxpayer. There-
fore changes in explanatory factors inuence both the level of tax evasion and the choice
of preparer mode. In this case, the long-run total tax evasion elasticity is given by
13

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The total short-run elasticity of tax evasion with respect to simple income is 0.402.
The short-run elasticities for the three assisted modes are 0.038 for Non-paid, 0.238 for
Paid, and 0.071 for Practitioner prepared returns. Increases in non-wage income have
the greatest eect on tax evasion, with a total short-run elasticity of tax evasion of 0.762.
Interestingly, the largest component of the short-run eect is from self-prepared returns
with a short-run elasticity of 0.321 followed next by paid preparer's at 0.210 followed by
Practitioner prepared returns at 0.182. The overall eect of state and local taxes on tax
evasion is small, with a short-run elasticity of 0.123 and a long-run elasticity of 0.135.
13
Dubin, Graetz, Udell, and Wilde [3] provide the calculation of
@P
ij
@X
ij
.
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Table 4: Short Run and Long Run Elasticities of Tax Evasion
Long Run
Short Run Elasticities Elasticities
Mode Self Non-paid Paid Practitioner Total Total
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SIMPLE 0.055 0.038 0.238 0.071 0.402 0.325
COMPLEX 0.321 0.049 0.210 0.182 0.762 0.771
ASSET 0.108 0.015 -0.042 0.042 0.123 0.135
EXEMPTION -0.033 0.006 -0.016 -0.007 -0.050 -0.057
OVER 65 -0.118 -0.011 0.013 -0.025 -0.141 -0.165
FORM 0.374 0.055 -0.171 -0.204 0.054 -0.412
PENALTY 0.250 0.021 0.163 0.001 0.435 0.398
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Consistent with our expectations, larger state and local tax burdens increase evasion
on Practitioner prepared returns with an elasticity of 0.042. Family size has very little
overall eect on tax evasion. Additionally, the evasion elasticity with respect to age is
small at -0.141.
Our most denitive results relate to return complexity. The short-run total elasticity
is 0.054. The small size of this eect belies its distributional character because the
short-run elasticities for Practitioner and Paid prepared returns are -0.203 and -0.171
respectively. However, these are more than oset by the short-run elasticities for the
Self and Non-paid modes of return preparation, at 0.374 and 0.055 respectively. For
those able to purchase tax expertise through a Paid preparer or a Practitioner, increased
complexity results in lower tax evasion, while the opposite holds for the Self and Non-Paid
modes of return preparation.
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These results are even more striking when viewed in the
long-run. Dubin, Graetz, Udell, and Wilde [3] show that increases in complexity increase
the demand for Practitioners and reduce the demand for Self preparation. This explains
why the long-run tax evasion elasticity with respect to return complexity is negative in
Table 4.
Of course a taxpayer's situation may become more complicated in multiple dimen-
sions. For instance, it's possible and likely for a taxpayer to both experience an increase
in non-wage income while presenting a more complex return. To illustrate this, suppose
an average taxpayer receives an additional $1000 of non-wage income and has one addi-
tional form to complete. In the short-run total tax evasion increases by $24 per return
from $237 to $261, an increase of over 9 percent in evasion. In the long-run total tax
evasion increases by less than $4 per return, an increase of less than 2 percent in total
tax evasion. The dierence between the short and long run eects is due to the change
in return preparation mode from self and non-paid to paid and practitioner types.
4.2 Conclusion
We nd evidence that tax evasion increases with increases in complex income but de-
creases with more complex returns. These long run eects are the result of both the
increased demand for Practitioners and the reduction in tax evasion associated with re-
turns prepared by Practitioners. Our evidence therefore supports the perspective of the
Nitzan and Tzur [12] and Melamud, Wolfson and Ziv [11] who view Practitioners as
providing an attestation role for the IRS. These results also suggests that policies that
would increase the demand for Practitioners, such as eliminating the income threshold
restrictions necessary to take the deduction for the use of a tax Practitioner, may be cost
eective because of their ability to increase compliance. Similarly, an unexpected benet
of the recent increase in taxpayer burden from the reporting of capital gains may be an
increase overall compliance as taxpayers shift to paid preparers and tax practitioners as
opposed to self-preparation.
14
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that Practitioners provide an attestation function for
the IRS.
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